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Abstract
Cooperative games with partial cooperation cover a wider rank of
real word situations than the classic model of cooperative games where
every subset of a set of agents can form a coalition to execute the game.
In this paper, the set of feasible coalitions which models the partial coop-
eration will be given by a union stable system. These systems contain,
as particular cases, the communication situations and the permission
structures, which are well-known both from a theoretical and applied
point of view. Moreover, union stable systems are a natural framework
for many other economic situations that arise in practice and which can
not be modelled by these subsystems. In this paper, the goal is to make
clear that there exists a close relationship between the Myerson value
and the conference game. For that, we rst analyze the relation between
the restricted game and the conference game to establish later which ef-
fects a union stable system has on certain desirable properties of these
games. Using the superuous support property, dened through the
conference game, new characterizations for the Myerson value are given
in this context.
JEL Classication C71
Key words: Conference game, restricted game, union stable system,
Myerson value, superuous support property.
1 Introduction
In the classical model of transferable utility games it is generally assumed that
any subset of a set N of players can form a coalition and cooperate. However,
many real world situations appear which require a more rened model which
takes into account restrictions in cooperation. In Myersons [14] model the
feasible coalitions are induced by connected subgraphs. This line of research
was continued by Owen [19], Borm et al. [7], van den Nouweland et al. [17]
and Potters and Reijnierse [20]. However, as stated by Myerson himself,
partial cooperation can not always be modelled by a graph, so, the original
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communication model has been generalized in several directions, for instance
towards conference structures by Myerson [15], hypergraph communication
situations by van den Nouweland et al. [17] and union stable systems by
Algaba et al. [1, 2].
In Algaba et al. [1, 2] it is assumed that if two feasible coalitions have com-
mon players, these ones will act as intermediaries between the two coalitions
in order to establish meaningful communication in the union of these coali-
tions. These feasible coalition systems are called union stable systems. This
mathematical feature is essential and the only requirement in these systems
to establish the cooperation. In fact, di¤erent lines of research in the litera-
ture of cooperative games can be unied through these systems. For instance,
the feasible coalitions coming from graph communication situations [14] and
permission structures (see [8, 12]) are special union stable systems. Further-
more, these systems have a close relation with the hypergraph communication
situations [4]. Important properties on the class of union stable systems have
been studied by Faigle et al. [11] who in this framework nd a meaningful
notion of supermodularity that extends Shapley´s convex cooperative model.
The basis of a union stable system requires special attention and it is
formed by its supports that in a communication situation are the edges of
the graph and the singletons. In fact, the supports are those feasible coali-
tions that are not the union of two other non-disjoint feasible coalitions. All
other feasible coalitions can be written as a union of non-disjoint supports.
Two games that play an important role in games on union stable systems are
the restricted game and the conference game, generalizing the corresponding
games for communication situations. The restricted game is dened on the
set of players and assigns to every coalition of players the worth that they can
earn given the cooperation restrictions. The conference game is dened on the
set of non unitary supports of the union stable system and assigns to every
coalition of non unitary supports the worth that the grand coalitionconsist-
ing of all players can earn in the union stable cooperation structure generated
by these supports. In this paper, we rst analyze the relation between the re-
stricted game and the conference game to establish later what e¤ects a union
stable system has on certain desirable properties of these games. In this way,
relations between the properties of the restricted game and the conference
game are investigated. We also consider the Myerson value, studied earlier in
Algaba et al. [2], and show that from the study of the convexity of the con-
ference game, we can provide su¢ cient conditions under which the Myerson
value is in the core of the restricted game without requiring conditions on the
structure or the restricted game. This emphasizes the role of the conference
game on the Myerson value and a new approach to it.
After that we use supports and the conference game to provide axiomati-
zations of the Myerson value for games on union stable systems. In particu-
lar, we use the superuous support property stating that the payo¤ allocation
should not depend on supports that in some sense have no contribution. To-
gether with component e¢ ciency, component dummy, additivity and point
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unanimity we give a characterization of the Myerson value on a special class
of union stable systems that contains those that arise from cycle-free graphs
(and on which the position value was characterized in [1]). We also provide an
axiomatization of the Myerson value on the class of all union stable systems
by replacing the superuous support property by the new strong superuous
support property which is dened using the restricted game, and inspired by
the corresponding axiom for communication situations in van den Nouweland
[18].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the general concepts
on classical cooperation, the main denitions on restricted cooperation by
means of union stable systems including the crucial driving notions of basis
and supports, the restricted game, the conference game as well as the Myerson
value and the position value. In Section 3, we analyze the relation between the
restricted game and the conference game and the inheritance of properties.
Section 4 contains axiomatizations of the Myerson value. We rst provide
an axiomatization for games on the special class of union stable systems that
generalize the set of connected coalitions in a cycle-free graph, using the
superuous support property. Second, we provide an axiomatization on the
class of all union stable systems by means of the strong superuous support
property. Finally, a section of conclusions is given.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Cooperative TU-games
A cooperative transferable utility (TU)-game is a pair (N; v) where N =
f1; : : : ; ng is a nite set of players and v : 2N ! R with v(;) = 0; is a
characteristic function. A game (N; v) is non-negative if v(S)  0 for all
S  N .
A distribution of the amount v(N) among the players will be represented
by a real-valued vector x 2 Rn. Here xi represents the payo¤ to player i
according to the involved payo¤ vector x. A solution is a real-valued func-
tion that assigns a payo¤ vector to every game v. A solution f satises the
e¢ ciency principle if
P
j2N fj(v) = v(N):
The most well-known solution concept is the Shapley value (Shapley [21])
given by
i(v) =
X
SNnfig
(n  jSj   1)!(jSj)!
n!
(v(S [ fig)  v(S)); for all i 2 N:
The core of a game (N; v) is the set
C (v) = fx 2 Rn : x(N) = v(N); x(S)  v(S); for all S  Ng ;
where x(S) =
P
i2S xi and x (;) = 0.
Bondareva [6] and Shapley [22] state that a game (N; v) is balanced if
and only if it has a nonempty core. A game is called totally balanced if each
subgame is balanced.
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A game (N; v) is superadditive if cooperation is protable, i.e.,
v(S [ T )  v(S) + v(T ) for all disjoint coalitions S; T 2 2N :
A game (N; v) is convex if
v(S [ T ) + v(S \ T )  v(S) + v(T ) for all coalitions S; T 2 2N :
2.2 Union stable systems
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng be a nite set of players and F  2N a set system of
feasible coalitions. The set system F is called union stable if for all A;B 2 F
with A \B 6= ; it is satised that A [B 2 F .
Many real world situations nd their natural framework in these struc-
tures. For instance, suppose that player 1 is a homeowner who wants to sell
his/her house. Player 1 has signed a contract with a real estate agent that
represents player 2. So, player 1 only can sell his/her house by means of player
2. There are two buyers, players 3 and 4. Notice that in this economic appli-
cation, the family of feasible coalitions that can generate a surplus are only
those which make possible that the seller can sell his/her house. Therefore,
the coalitions which can trade are
F = ff1; 2; 3g ; f1; 2; 4g ; f1; 2; 3; 4gg : (1)
An important subclass of union stable systems is communication situations
as considered in Myerson [14]. A communication situation is a triple (N; v;E),
where (N; v) is a game and (N;E) is a simple graph. It is easy to see that the
set system F , dened by those coalitions which induce connected subgraphs
is a union stable system. However, in practice, a union stable system can
not always be modelled by a communication situation (see van den Brink [9]
for a characterization of the set systems that can be obtained as connected
coalitions in a communication graph). For example, the set system F pointed
out above with one seller/two buyers and a real state agent as intermediary
is a union stable system which cannot be the set of connected coalitions
in a communication graph. So, union stable systems not only allow for a
generalization of set systems derived from communication graphs but also a
better understanding and insight of them and their applications.
Let F be a union stable system and G  F : The following families are
dened inductively
G(0) = G; G(n) =
n
S [ T : S; T 2 G(n 1); S \ T 6= ;
o
(n = 1; 2; : : :)
Notice that G(0)  G(n 1)  G(n)  F ; since G  F and F is union
stable. We dene G by G = G(k); where k is the smallest integer such that
G(k+1) = G(k):
For each union stable family F , it is interesting to nd a minimal subset
B (F) such that B (F) = F . So, the following set is well-dened:
E (F) = fG 2 F : G = A [B; A 6= G; B 6= G; A;B 2 F ; A \B 6= ;g:
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The set B (F) = F n E (F) ; is called the basis of F , and the elements of
B (F) are called supports of F . We remark that the basis B (F) is the minimal
subset of the union stable system F such that B (F) = F (see Algaba et al.
[1]).
Let G  2N be a set system and let S  N . A set T  S is called a
G-component of S if T 2 G and there exists no T 0 2 G such that T  T 0  S.
Therefore, the G-components of S are the maximal feasible coalitions that
belong to G and are contained in S. We denote by CG(S) the collection of the
G-components of S. Union stable systems can be characterized in terms of the
F-components of a coalition in the following way: The set system F  2N is
union stable if and only if for any S  N with CF (S) 6= ;, the F-components
of S are a collection of pairwise disjoint subsets of S.
Let (N; v) be a cooperative game and F  2N a union stable system.
Let B(F) be the basis of F and C(F) = fB 2 B(F) : jBj  2g. If there is no
confusion we will just write B and C. The F-restricted game vF : 2N ! R;
is dened on the player set and is given by vF (S) =
P
T2CF (S) v(T ). On the
other hand, the conference game is dened on the basis of a union stable
system and it is the game
 C; vC where vC : 2C ! R, is given by vC (A) =
vA(N).
Note that the game
 C; vC is well dened since for each A  C; A is a
union stable system. The F-restricted game focuses on the role of a player
in creating economic possibilities and establishing meaningful communication
among the players whereas the conference game measures the economic value
of the grand coalition when specic parts of the cooperation structure are
considered.
The two above denitions extend the point game (introduced by Myerson
[14]) and the arc game (introduced by Borm et al. [7]) for communication
situations, where for a communication situation (N; v;E) we have that C =
ffi; jg : fi; jg 2 Eg.
A union stable cooperation structure is a triple (N; v;F) where N =
f1; : : : ; ng is the set of players, (N; v) is a game with v : 2N ! R satisfy-
ing v(;) = 0; and F is a union stable system. For convenience, we assume
from now on that the underlying game (N; v) is zero-normalized.
The set of all union stable cooperation structures on N will be denoted
by USN = f(N; v;F) : F is union stableg :
We will denote by USIN a special subclass of USN where the following
two conditions are satised:
(1) For all S; T 2 F , with jS \ T j  2 we have S \ T 2 F .
(2) All non-unitary feasible coalitions can be written in a unique way as a
union of non-unitary supports.
Notice that this subclass of union stable cooperation structures generalizes
those communication situations for which the graphs do not contain cycles.
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2.3 Allocation rules for union stable structures
An allocation rule on USN is a map  that assigns to each union stable
cooperation structure (N; v;F) a payo¤ vector,  (N; v;F) 2 Rn.
Both the Myerson value and the position value are dened from the Shap-
ley value [21] of the two games that were dened above, the F-restricted game
and the conference game respectively. The Myerson value was introduced in
Myerson [14] and later extended in [15]. Myerson pointed out the need to
generalize this model towards restricted cooperation situations which can not
be modelled by a graph. This idea has been studied by van den Nouweland et
al. [17] and Algaba et al. [2]. So, given (N; v;F) a union stable cooperation
structure, the Myerson value denoted by  (N; v;F) 2 Rn is dened by
 (N; v;F) =   N; vF :
The position value for graph communication situations was rst intro-
duced in Meesen [13] and studied in Borm et al. [7]. This value was extended
to hypergraph communication situations in [17] and is dened in union sta-
ble cooperation structures in [1]. Let (N; v;F) be a union stable cooperation
structure. The position value, denoted by  (N; v;F) 2 Rn, is given by
i (N; v;F) =
X
C2Ci(F)
1
jCjC
 C; vC ; for i 2 N:
where Ci (F) = fC 2 C : i 2 Cg. When there is no confusion we will often
write Ci instead of Ci (F).
The following example illustrates the concepts of Myerson and position
values for the economic application introduced in (1).
Consider the player set N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and the union stable family given
by F = ff1; 2; 3g ; f1; 2; 4g ; Ng : Let v : 2N ! R be dened by v(S) = jSj   1
if jSj  1. Then,
B = C = ff1; 2; 3g ; f1; 2; 4gg :
In this case,
vF (S) =
 jSj   1; if S 2 F ,
0; otherwise.
Hence, the Myerson value for this situation is
 (N; v;F) =

13
12
;
13
12
;
5
12
;
5
12

:
The conference game is given by
A  C A CA(N) vC (A)
ff1; 2; 3gg ff1; 2; 3gg ff1; 2; 3gg 2
ff1; 2; 4gg ff1; 2; 4gg ff1; 2; 4gg 2
ff1; 2; 3g ; f1; 2; 4gg ff1; 2; 3g ; f1; 2; 4g ; f1; 2; 3; 4gg ff1; 2; 3; 4gg 3
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Thus,
 (N; v;F) =

1; 1;
1
2
;
1
2

:
3 Relation between the conference game and the restricted
game
In the same way that there exists a connection between the arc game and the
point game as shown in van den Nouweland and Borm [16], here we establish
a relation between the restricted game
 
N; vF

, and the conference game C; vC. Notice that the Myerson value and the position value have been
dened from the Shapley value of the restricted game and the conference
game respectively. So, the relationship between the restricted game and the
conference game as well as the inheritance of properties as superadditivity,
balancedness and convexity allows for a deeper knowledge and better insight
into them.
Theorem 1 Let (N; v;F) be a union stable cooperation structure and  C; vC
the associated conference game. Then, for each S  N it is satised that
vF (S) = vC (CS) ;
where CS = fC 2 C : C  Sg.
Proof. Let S  N . If CF (S) = ;, it is straightforward that CS = ; and thus
vF (S) = 0. Otherwise, vF (S) =
P
T2CF (S) v(T ): Consider FS = fF 2 F :
F  Sg. Then FS is a union stable system such that CFS (N) = CF (S). Its
basis is BS = fB 2 B : B  Sg. Let CS be the set formed by the supports of
BS which have cardinal at least two. It holds that CS  C. Therefore, for any
coalition S  N it is satised that
vC(CS) = vCS (N) = vBS (N) =
X
M2CBS (N)
v(M) =
X
T2CF (S)
v(T );
since CFS (N) = CF (S) and the game (N; v) is zero-normalized. 
The following results state the inheritance of balancedness, superadditivity
and convexity from the conference game to the restricted game. First, we
consider balancedness.
Theorem 2 Let (N; v;F) be a union stable cooperation structure. If  C; vCis
non-negative and balanced, then
 
N; vF

is balanced.
Proof. As
 C; vC is non-negative and balanced,
C
 
vC

=
(
y 2 RjCj+ :
X
C2C
yC = v
C (C) ;
X
A2A
yA  vC (A) ;8A  C
)
6= ;:
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Let y 2 C  vC. From y, we construct the vector x 2 Rn in the following way
xi =
P
C2Ci
1
jCjyC ; if Ci 6= ;;
0; otherwise,
for each i 2 N . We have to prove that x 2 C  vF ; i.e.,X
i2N
xi = v
F (N) and
X
i2S
xi  vF (S); 8S  N:
Indeed, rst
X
i2N
xi=
X
i2N
24X
C2Ci
1
jCjyC
35 =X
C2C
"X
i2C
1
jCjyC
#
=
X
C2C

jCj 1jCjyC

=
X
C2C
yC = v
C (C) :
= vF (N):
On the other hand, X
i2S
xi =
X
i2S
24X
C2Ci
1
jCjyC
35 :
By Theorem 1, for each S  N , vC (CS) = vF (S) and as yC  0 and moreover
fC 2 CS : i 2 Cg  Ci, we have
X
i2S
xi=
X
i2S
24X
C2Ci
1
jCjyC
35 X
i2S
24 X
fC2CS :i2Cg
1
jCjyC
35
=
X
C2CS

1
jCj jCj

yC =
X
C2CS
yC  vC (CS) = vF (S);
where the last inequality holds because y 2 C  vC. Hence we conclude that 
N; vF

is balanced. 
A similar result holds with respect to superadditivity.
Theorem 3 Let (N; v;F) be a union stable cooperation structure. If  C; vC
is superadditive and non-negative, then
 
N; vF

is superadditive.
Proof. Let S; T  N; S \ T = ;: We have to prove that
vF (S [ T )  vF (S) + vF (T ). (2)
By Theorem 1,
vF (S) = vC (CS) ; vF (T ) = vC (CT ) ; vF (S [ T ) = vC (CS[T ) ;
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therefore, the expression (2) is equivalent to
vC (CS[T )  vC (CS) + vC (CT ) :
For that, it su¢ ces to prove that CS \ CT = ; and that CS [ CT  CS[T
since, by the superadditivity and the monotonicity of the game
 C; vC, we
have
vC (CS) + vC (CT )  vC (CS [ CT )  vC (CS[T ) :
On the one hand, since
CS  2S ; CT  2T ; S \ T = ; we have CS \ CT = ;:
On the other hand, by construction of CS ; CT and CS[T we conclude that
CS [ CT  CS[T . 
The next example illustrates that, in general, balancedness or superaddi-
tivity of the underlying restricted game does not imply this property for the
conference game.
Example 1 Let (N; v;F) be a union stable cooperation structure, where (N;F)
is the union stable system considered in (1), i.e., N = f1; 2; 3; 4g, the feasible
coalition system is F = ff1; 2; 3g ; f1; 2; 4g ; f1; 2; 3; 4gg and let the game be
given by
v(S) =
 jSj ; if j S j 2;
0; otherwise.
Note, that game (N; v) is totally balanced and therefore so is the game (N; vF )
(see [3]). The corresponding conference game
 C; vC is given by vC(ff1; 2; 3gg) =
vC(ff1; 2; 4gg) = 3 and vC(ff1; 2; 3g; f1; 2; 4gg) = 4, and thus is not balanced,
since C = B = ff1; 2; 3g ; f1; 2; 4gg and hence,
C
 
vC

=
n
y 2 RjCj : yf1;2;3g + yf1;2;4g = 4, yf1;2;3g  3, yf1;2;4g  3
o
= ;:
The game (N; v) is also superadditive and it is easy to show that then so is
the game (N; vF ). However, the conference game
 C; vC is not superadditive,
since
vC(ff1; 2; 3g ; f1; 2; 4gg)  vC(ff1; 2; 3gg) + vC(ff1; 2; 4gg);
As mentioned above this example can not be modelled by a communication
situation.
Next, we study the transmission of convexity from the game
 C; vC to 
N; vF

.
Theorem 4 Let (N; v;F) be a union stable cooperation structure. If the
conference game
 C; vC is non-negative and convex then  N; vF is convex.
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Proof. Let i 2 N and S; T such that S  T  N n fig. We have to prove
that
vF (S [ fig)  vF (S)  vF (T [ fig)  vF (T ):
By Theorem 1, it holds that
vF (S [ fig) = vC  CS[fig ; vF (S) = vC (CS) ;
vF (T [ fig) = vC  CT[fig ; vF (T ) = vC (CT ) :
Therefore, the above is equivalent to prove that
vC
 CS[fig  vC (CS)  vC  CT[fig  vC (CT ) :
On the one hand, as CS[fig, CT[fig, CS and CT are the sets of non-unitary
supports of the union stable systems
 
N;FS[fig

;
 
N;FT[fig

; (N;FS) and
(N;FT ), respectively, it is satised that
CS[fig [ CT  CT[fig and CS[fig \ CT = CS .
On the other hand, as
 C; vC is non negative and superadditive, we have
vC
 CT[fig  vC  CS[fig [ CT  :
Moreover, by convexity of the game
 C; vC it holds
vC
 CS[fig [ CT   vC (CT ) vC  CS[fig  vC  CS[fig \ CT 
= vC
 CS[fig  vC (CS) .
Combining the two last expressions, we conclude
vC
 CS[fig  vC (CS)  vC  CS[fig [ CT   vC (CT )  vC  CT[fig  vC (CT ) .

A study about the convexity between the original game and the conference
game can be found in [1], where subclasses of union stable families for which
the convexity of the original game is inherited by the restricted game and the
conference game respectively are given.
Notice that by means of properties of the conference game, it is possible
to deduce conditions under which the Myerson value is in the core of the
restricted game. It emphasizes the connection between the conference game
and the Myerson value.
Theorem 4 and the fact that  (N; v) 2 C (v) if v is convex, immediately
yield the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Let (N; v;F) be a union stable cooperation structure. If the
conference game
 C; vC is non-negative and convex then
 (N; v;F) 2 C  vF :
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The transmission of the convexity from the original game to the confer-
ence game requires conditions on the union stable cooperation structure. In
fact, if (N; v;F) 2 USIN and (N; v) is convex then  C; vC is convex (see
[1]). Moreover, notice that if (N; v) is superadditive and zero-normalized then C; vC is positive. Therefore, applying the above corollary, we can assure that
on the subclass USIN , if the original game is convex then the Myerson value
is in the core of the restricted game.
Corollary 2 Let (N; v;F) 2 USIN . If the original game (N; v) is convex
then
 (N; v;F) 2 C  vF :
4 The Myerson value and superuous supports
The Myerson value and the position value are allocation rules satisfying com-
ponent e¢ ciency and component dummy. In [2] the classical axiomatization
of the Myerson value is given. In this section we focus on the superuous
support property which is satised by the Myerson value and the position
value.
We rst characterize the Myerson value on the subclass USIN of union
stable cooperation structures where the position value was characterized (see
[1]) using the superuous support property. After that, the introduction of a
stronger property than the superuous player property and superuous sup-
port property allows us to provide new characterizations for the Myerson value
on the class of all union stable cooperation structures. These axiomatizations
generalize the given ones in communication situations by van den Nouweland
[18].
4.1 Axiomatizations of the Myerson value on USIN using the
superuous support property
First, we recall some standard axioms. An allocation rule  : USN ! RN is
called component-e¢ cient if for all (N; v;F) 2 USN ; M 2 CF (N), we haveP
i2M i (N; v;F) = v(M):
An allocation rule  : USN ! RN is called component dummy if for all
i =2 SM2CF (N)M , we have i (N; v;F) = 0.
An allocation rule  : USN ! RN is additive if
 (N; v + w;F) =  (N; v;F) +  (N;w;F)
for all (N; v;F) ; (N;w;F) 2 USN :
The Myerson value satisfying these three properties is shown in Algaba
et al. [2]. Next we give formally the concept of superuous support property
which is dened using the conference game that was studied in the previous
section.
The support H 2 C is called superuous for (N; v;F) 2 USN if vC (A) =
vC (A n fHg) ; for all A  C, i.e., if support H is a null player in the conference
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game. An allocation rule  : USN ! RN has the superuous support property
if  (N; v;F) = 

N; v;B n fHg

; for all (N; v;F) 2 USN and for every
superuous support H 2 C for (N; v;F).
Theorem 5 The Myerson value  : USN ! Rn satises the superuous
support property.
Proof. Let H 2 C be a superuous support. We have to prove that
 (N; v;F) = 

N; v;B n fHg

:
As
i (N; v;F) =
X
fSN :i2Sg
(S)

vF (S)  vF (S n fig) ;
and
i

N; v;B n fHg

=
X
fSN :i2Sg
(S)
h
vBnfHg(S)  vBnfHg(S n fig)
i
;
it is su¢ cient to prove that vF (S) = vBnfHg(S), for all S  N:
Theorem 1 implies that vC (CS) = vF (S).
Let F 0 =
n
F 2 B n fHg : F  S
o
, and let B0S be the basis of F 0S . Then
we have that B0S = BS n fHg ; C0S  C and
vC
 C0S = vC0S (N) = vF 0S (N) = vBnfHg (S) :
The fact that B0S = BS n fHg and H 2 C is a superuous support imply
vF (S) = vC (CS) = vC (CS n fHg) = vC

C0S

= vBnfHg (S) : 
Notice that the superuous support property is focussed on the conference
game. Whereas the conference game concentrates on the role of the supports,
the restricted game does on the role of the players. However, we should take
into account that the conference game is closely related to the restricted game
as we have shown in Theorem 1 and the analysis of the inheritance of prop-
erties between these games carried out in Section 2. In fact, the superuous
support property will allow for a new characterization of the Myerson value.
The Myerson value also satises point anonymity as is shown in [2]. A
union stable structure (N; v;F) is called point anonymous if there exists a
function f : f0; 1; : : : ; jD(F)jg ! R such that vF (S) = f (jS \D(F)j) for all
S  N , where D (F) = fi 2 N : Ci 6= ;g. When there is no confusion we will
often write D instead of D (F).
An allocation rule  satises point anonymity if for all point anonymous
(N; v;F), there exists  2 R such that
i (N; v;F) =

; for all i 2 D;
0; otherwise.
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Weakening point anonymity in a similar way as the corresponding property
for communication structures of Borm et al. [7] is weakened by van den Brink
et al. [10] yields point unanimity. A union stable structure (N; v;F) is called
point unanimous if it is point anonymous with function f : f0; 1; : : : ; jDjg ! R
such that f (k) = 0, for all k 2 f0; 1; : : : ; jDj   1g, i.e., the restricted game is
a multiple of the unanimity game on D.
An allocation rule  satises point unanimity if for all point unanimous
(N; v;F), there exists  2 R such that
i (N; v;F) =

; for all i 2 D;
0; otherwise.
Since the Myerson value satises point anonymity, it also satises the
weaker point unanimity. Next we show that the above properties characterize
the Myerson value when we restrict ourselves to the class USIN , where on
the class USIN the axioms are dened in a similar way as before on the full
class USN .
Theorem 6 The Myerson value  : USIN ! Rn is the unique allocation rule
on USIN that satises component e¢ ciency, component-dummy, additivity,
the superuous support property and point unanimity.
Proof. The Myerson value satisfying component e¢ ciency, component-dummy,
additivity and point anonymity (and therefore also point unanimity) is already
shown in Algaba et al. [2], while the superuous support property follows from
Theorem 5.
To show uniqueness, let (N; v;F) 2 USIN and let  : USIN ! Rn satisfy
the above properties. Since the game v is zero-normalized, it can be expressed
as
v =
X
fT :jT j2g
TuT ; with uT the unanimity games.
As  is additive, it is su¢ cient to show that  (N; uT ;F),  2 R, is
unique for all T  N with jT j  2. To prove this, x T  N with jT j  2.
We distinguish two cases
Case 1. There exist no coalition S 2 F such that T  S:
Since (uT )
F = , the triple (N; uT ;F) is point unanimous, (because
there exists _f : f0; 1; : : : ; jDjg ! R, f (0) =    = f (jDj) = 0, such that
(uT )
F (H) = f (jH \Dj) = 0, for all H  N), there exists  2 R such that
i (N; uT ;F) =

; if i 2 D;
0; otherwise.
Applying component e¢ ciency and adding over components, we haveX
i2N
i (N; uT ;F) = jDj = (uT )F (N) = 0.
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If D 6= ;, we have that  = 0, and therefore
i (N; uT ;F) = 0 for all i 2 N:
If D = ;, then for each i 2 N , we have two possibilities.
If fig =2 F then i =2 SM2CF (N)M and i (N; uT ;F) = 0, by component
dummy.
If fig 2 F then fig 2 CF (N) and, applying component-e¢ ciency
i (N; uT ;F) = (uT )F (fig) = 0;
since jT j  2. In any case, i (N; uT ;F) = 0, for all i 2 N .
Case 2. There exists a coalition S 2 F such that T  S:
Consider the set fF 2 F : T  Fg, which is non-empty since there exists
S 2 F such that T  S, and let
T =
\
fF 2 F : T  Fg :
The set T is non-empty and it is the minimal feasible set that contains T .
Hence,
(uT )
F (H) = uT (H) =

; if T  H,
0; otherwise.
Since
(i)
(uT )
C (A) =
X
M2CA(N)
(uT ) (M) =
X
M2CA(N)
uT (M);
(ii)
P
M2CA(N) uT (M) =  if and only if uT (M) = 1, for some M 2
CA(N),
(iii)
uT (M) = 1() T M; with M 2 A  F ,
(iv) T 2 F is the smallest feasible set that contains T , we have
uT (M) = 1() T  T M , with M 2 A  F ,
it follows that the conference game associated to uT is,
(uT )
C : 2C ! R; (uT )C (A) =

; if T 2 A;
0; otherwise.
On the other hand, as T =
S
k2K Bk, with Bk 2 C; for all k 2 K, we have
T M; M 2 A  F () fBkgk2K  A,
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because the expression of each non-unitary feasible coalition as a union of
non-unitary supports is unique. Hence,
(uT )
C (A) =

; if fBkgk2K  A,
0; otherwise.
All supports B 2 C such that B =2 fBkgk2K , are superuous for the conference
game. Therefore, repeatedly applying the superuous support property to the
allocation rule , we nd
 (N; uT ;F) =    = 

N; uT ;F 0

,
where F 0 =

Bk
	
k2K

[ (ffjg : fjg 2 Fg) :
As (uT )
F 0 = uT , we have uT (S) = uT
 
S \ T  for all S  N , and as
T \ S  T ,
uT (S) = uT
 
S \ T  = ; if S \ T = T ;
0; otherwise.
Therefore, the game (uT )
F 0 is point unanimous with
D = fi 2 N : jCij > 0g = T ;
and f(0) =    = f (jDj   1) = 0, f (jDj) = .
As  satises point unanimity, we nd that for all i 2 N , there exists
 2 R such that
i
 
N; uT ;F 0

=

; if i 2 T ;
0; otherwise.
Taking into account component-e¢ ciency and component-dummy,X
i2N
i
 
N; uT ;F 0

=
T   = ,
and hence  = jT j . Therefore, for all i 2 N ,
i
 
N; uT ;F 0

=
8<:
T  ; if i 2 T ;
0; otherwise.

Since point anonymity implies point unanimity, the Myerson value  :
USIN ! Rn is the unique allocation rule on USIN that satises component
e¢ ciency, component-dummy, additivity, the superuous support property
and point anonymity.
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4.2 Axiomatizations of the Myerson value on USN using the
strong superuous support property
Replacing in Theorem 6 the superuous support property for the strong super-
uous support property in the above axiomatic characterization, we provide a
new characterization of the Myerson value on USN .
An allocation rule  : USN ! Rn satises the strong superuous support
property if for all (N; v;F) 2 USN and for all non-unitary supports H 2 C
whose absence does not inuence the F-restricted game, i.e.,
vF (S) = vBnfHg(S), for all S  N;
it is veried that
 (N; v;F) = 

N; v;B n fHg

:
Notice that the strong superuous support property is centered on the re-
stricted game instead of the conference game. This new property states that
the solution is the same after removing a support which has no inuence on
the communication in the sense that it does not change the worth of coalitions
in the restricted game.
Also notice that the strong superuous support property implies the su-
peruous support property but the reverse is not true. Indeed, from the
proof of Theorem 5 it follows that if H 2 C is a superuous support then
vF (S) = vBnfHg(S), for all S  N . Therefore, if an allocation rule satises
the strong superuous support property then
 (N; v;F) = 

N; v;B n fHg

:
However, if H 2 C satises that vF (S) = vBnfHg(S), for all S  N then the
support H is not necessarily a superuous support.
Before establishing the axiomatic characterization of the Myerson value
on the class of all union stable structures, we prove an interesting result which
assures that for all (N; v;F) 2 USN the outcome in the game is the same as
the restricted game for any allocation rule satisfying component e¢ ciency,
component-dummy, additivity and point unanimity.
Lemma 1 If  is an allocation rule that satises additivity, component e¢ -
ciency, component-dummy and point unanimity, then
 (N; v;F) =   N; vF ;F ;
for all (N; v;F) 2 USN .
Proof. By additivity of , it su¢ ces to show that 
 
N; v   vF ;F = 0,
for all (N; v;F) 2 USN . First  N; v   vF ;F is point unanimous since 
v   vFF (S) = 0, for all S  N . (Indeed, let f : f0; 1; : : : ; jDjg ! R such
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that f(k) = 0, with k = 0; 1; : : : ; jDj. Then,  v   vFF (S) = f (jS \Dj) = 0,
for all S  N .) Therefore, there exists  2 R such that
i
 
N; v   vF ;F = ; if i 2 D,
0; otherwise.
Let M 2 CF (N) such that jM j > 1. As  satises component e¢ ciency, we
have that X
i2M
i
 
N; v   vF ;F =  jM j =  v   vF (M) = 0,
and thus  = 0. Hence, i
 
N; v   vF ;F = 0, for all i 2 N . 
Obviously, the above lemma is satised when substituting point unanimity
for point anonymity.
Next, as mentioned above, we establish a characterization of the Myerson
value on USN only by replacing in the given characterization the superuous
support property with the strong superuous support property. Here, we use
the characterization given in [2], where the Myerson value is characterized
using the superuous player property, which is analogous to the superuous
support property changing the conference game for the restricted game and
the role of the supports for players.
Let (N; v;F) 2 USN . A player i 2 N is called superuous for (N; v;F)
if vF (S) = vF (S n fig) ; for all S  N . An allocation rule  satises the su-
peruous player property if for all (N; v;F) and every player i 2 N that
is superuous for (N; v;F) it holds  (N; v;F) =   N; v;FNnfig, where
FNnfig = fF 2 F : F  N n figg :
Theorem 7 The Myerson value  : USN ! Rn is the unique allocation rule
on USN that satises component e¢ ciency, component-dummy, additivity,
the strong superuous support property and point unanimity.
Proof. By denition, it is straightforward that the Myerson value satis-
es the strong superuous support property. Therefore, it only remains to
prove uniqueness. Let  be an allocation rule on USN that satises compo-
nent e¢ ciency, component-dummy, additivity, the strong superuous support
property and point unanimity. To prove that  is uniquely determined, we
rst prove that if an allocation rule on USN satises the strong superuous
support property then it satises the superuous player property, and hence
as the Myerson value is the unique allocation rule on USN that satises ad-
ditivity, the superuous player property and point unanimity [2, Theorem
3.7] we deduce that  = . (In concrete, this characterization was shown
with point anonymity, but it is easy to check that the result holds with point
unanimity).
Let i 2 N be a superuous player for (N; v;F), i.e.,
vF (S) = vF (S n fig), for all S  N .
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We have to prove that
 (N; v;F) =   N; v;FNnfig ,
where FNnfig = fF 2 F : F  N n figg = fF 2 F : F  N , i =2 Fg = B n Bi
with Bi = fB 2 B : i 2 Bg.
As  is an additive allocation rule that satises component e¢ ciency,
component-dummy and point unanimity, by Lemma 1 we have
 (N; v;F) =   N; vF ;F . (3)
It is satised that CF (S n fig) = CFNnfig (S), for all S  N . Hence, if i 2 N
is a superuous player, then for all S  N
vF (S) = vF (S n fig) =
X
T2CF (Snfig)
v(T ) =
X
T2CFNnfig (S)
v(T ) = vFNnfig(S),
and thus, applying (3),
 (N; v;F) =   N; vF ;F =   N; vFNnfig ;F .
As FNnfig = B n Bi and vF = vFNnfig , then any support B 2 Bi has no
inuence in the F-restricted game since for all S  N ,
vF (S) = vFNnfig(S) = vBnBinfBg(S),
because B n Bi = B n Bi n fBg.
Applying the strong superuous support property repeatedly, for all B 2
Bi, we have
 (N; v;F) =   N; vFNnfig ;F =   N; vFNnfig ;FNnfig =   N; v;FNnfig .
Therefore,  is an allocation rule that satises the superuous player property
and we conclude
 (N; v;F) =  (N; v;F) , for all (N; v;F) 2 USN :

Taking into account that point anonymity implies point unanimity, the
Myerson value  : USN ! Rn is the unique allocation rule on USN that
satises component e¢ ciency, component-dummy, additivity, the strong su-
peruous support property and point anonymity.
5 Conclusions
This paper makes some contributions to cooperative game theory with re-
stricted cooperation in a framework that not only allows for the unication
and generalization of di¤erent research lines such as communication situations
or permission structures but also the analysis of economic applications which
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arise in this context. At rst sight, the Myerson value and the conference
game, and therefore the supports, are not related. In this paper, we show the
existence of a direct relationship between the Myerson value and the confer-
ence game. First, a study between the restricted game and the conference
game as well as an analysis of the transmission of properties reveals the close
connection between the Myerson value and the conference game. In fact, by
means of the conference game it can be established when the Myerson value
is in the core of the restricted game, without requirements about the struc-
ture or the restricted game. Second, an analysis about superuous supports,
or null players in the conference game, and the Myerson value leads us to
characterizations of the Myerson value on a special subclass of union stable
systems that contains those coming from cycle-free graphs. Finally, strength-
ening the superuous support property and superuous player property, two
new characterizations for the Myerson value are provided on the class of all
union stable structures. Therefore, important properties and characteriza-
tions of the Myerson value for games on union stable systems can be stated
by the study of the conference game.
For communication situations, van den Brink et al. [10] introduce the
class of Harsanyi power solution which can be obtained by distributing the
Harsanyi dividends in the point game proportional to some power measure
for communication graphs. This class contains the Myerson value which is
obtained by using the equal power measure. This approach is generalized
to games on union stable systems by Algaba et al. [5]. Although every
Harsanyi power solution satises the superuous support property on the
class USIN; in general they do not satisfy this property on USN; and therefore
the same is true for the strong superuous support property. Thus, in some
sense the superuous support property and the role of the conference game
are characteristic for the Myerson value within the class of Harsanyi power
solutions. On the other hand, the position value, which has a quite di¤erent
interpretation and denition than the Myerson value (introduced through the
conference game instead of the restricted game), also satises the superuous
support property on USN . However, this is not a Harsanyi power solution,
although it is on the class USIN .
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